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How Valuable are Chances?
H. Orri Stefa´nsson and Richard Bradley† ∗
Abstract
Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true
(or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indif-
ference. The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a re-
quirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal
Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centrepiece of von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Prin-
cipal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but that Linearity is not;
and hence, that Chance Neutrality is not rationally required.
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search Grant (14-AXA-PDOC-222). Bradley’s work on this paper was supported by grants
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1 Introduction
Suppose you have just learnt that you have won the lottery. Good news, we suppose. Now
you learn that your chances of winning were just 1/1010. Does the fact that your prior chances
of winning the lottery were so low, make it even better that you did win? In a similar vein,
suppose your doctor tells you that you have been diagnosed with a lethal condition of a very
rare kind that only afflicts one in a billion people. Is the desirability of what you have learnt
any different from the desirability of simply learning that you have this particular condition,
without any information about the chances? Or different from learning that you have a lethal
condition that is quite common? Finally, consider the following scenario. After driving home
from work, you realise that one of the wheels on your car is so loose that it was a matter of
great luck that it didn’t come off on the motorway, which would almost certainly have re-
sulted in a terrible accident. Is this risk of accident in any way undesirable, after the fact,
when there was no accident?
The standard answer to these three questions—embodied, for instance, in decision theory,
risk analysis and orthodox economics—is ‘No’. The lottery is valuable because of the prize
you get from winning. Having a chance of winning is certainly valuable at the start, but once
you know that you have won the lottery the desirability of that chance is ‘neutralised’. Simi-
larly, although it is clearly undesirable to learn that you have some chance of suffering from
a lethal condition (or having an accident), once you learn whether you in fact have the condi-
tion (or had the accident), the chances become irrelevant.1 On this orthodox view—which we
1This is not entirely correct, as we point out in Section 3.3, since even on the orthodox
view on chance, the chance of the condition might be practically relevant for instance if it
tells you something about the probability that an advanced treatment of it has been developed.
Similarly, the chance of winning the lottery might even on the orthodox view be practically
will term Chance Instrumentalism2—chances themselves are not carriers of value, but have
value only insofar as they are instrumental to the outcomes with which they are associated.
The aim of this paper is to question this orthodox view on the value of chances and risks
(which, as we are using the terms, are simply objective probabilities of gains or losses). In
particular, we will examine whether it can be practically rational to take chances of good out-
comes and risks of bad outcomes to play the role of ultimate goods in our practical and eval-
uative reasoning. Part of our motivation for exploring this thesis is the fact that seemingly
rational people answer questions like those we posed above in a way that is inconsistent with
the orthodoxy. For instance, many people feel that it would be worse to learn that they have a
lethal condition that only afflicts one person in a billion than just learning that they have the
condition, and that the former piece of news makes their condition much harder to accept.3
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we explain Chance Instrumentalism in
relevant if it gives you evidence about how large the prize is. To avoid this problem, we for-
malise the orthodox view in Section 3.3 in terms of (maximally specific) possible worlds
rather than (coarse grained) propositions.
2As far as we are aware, neither Chance Instrumentalism, nor its implication, Chance
Neutrality, has been explicitly discussed before in the philosophical or decision-theoretic lit-
erature. However, these principles are typically implicitly assumed in decision theory and, in
particular, applications of decision theory such as micro economics and risk analysis, where
the outcomes of interest are usually non-modal ones (i.e., they concern only what actually
happens).
3As we discuss in the next section (in the context of other examples), this type of exam-
ple only does what we want it to do if we assume that the former piece of news is harder to
accept than the latter because it is worse, rather than it being worse because it is harder to
accept.
slightly more detail and show how it relates to a thesis we call Chance Neutrality, according
to which the chance of an event should be a matter of indifference once we know whether the
event took place or not. We discuss two examples that seem to suggest that Chance Neutrality
is not a requirement of rationality, before proving (in Section 3) a theorem that we use to de-
termine whether Chance Neutrality really is rationally required. The theorem says that given
Chance Neutrality, David Lewis’ (1980) Principal Principle, according to which a person
who knows the objective chance of an event should set her credence (i.e., degrees of belief)
accordingly, entails Linearity, the claim that the value of a lottery is equal to the sum of the
values of the lottery’s prizes discounted by their probabilities. Hence, given that the Principal
Principle is (as we argue in Section 4) a requirement of rationality, Chance Neutrality can-
not be rationally required unless Linearity is. But as we argue in Section 5, Linearity is not
rationally required, and, therefore, neither is Chance Neutrality. Since Chance Neutrality is
entailed by the instrumentalist view on chance, this gives strong grounds for rejecting the lat-
ter. Finally, in Section 6 we reflect on the relationship between our argument against Chance
Neutrality and those of other critics of the orthodoxy who take issue with its treatment of risk
aversion.
2 Chance Neutrality
Why do we care about chances? One obvious answer is that chances matter to us because
the things that they are chances-of matter to us. One might care about the chances of cancer
because one wants to avoid cancer, about the chances of rainfall because one prefers to stay
indoors when it rains, and so on. This suggests that chances matter instrumentally. By im-
proving (or reducing) our chances we make it more (or less) likely that some state of affairs
that we care about will be realised. Moreover, learning that the chances of some state of af-
fairs that we care about are greater (or lesser) than we expected, gives us evidential reason
to increase (or reduce) our expectation of that state of affairs being realised. The value of a
chance that derives from the causal and/or evidential relations it stands in with respect to what
it is a chance-of is what we call its instrumental value.
On the Chance Instrumentalist view, chances have only instrumental value and do not
matter ‘intrinsically’4. If a chance of some good has only instrumental value in virtue of be-
ing a chance of that good, then it has no value independently of the realisation or otherwise
of the good in question. Or to put it slightly differently, if the value of a chance that X is ex-
hausted by its instrumental role in making it true that X, then once it is settled whether or not
X is true, there can be no further value associated with the chance of X. For if it is the case
that X then the chance is redundant and if it is not the case that X then the chance is inert.
(These are just two sides of the same coin: A chance of some magnitude α that X is a chance
of magnitude 1 − α that not X.) So Chance Instrumentalism implies that chances are neutral
in the sense that, conditional on X, it does not matter what the chances of X are.
The instrumental value of chance is often paramount in our deliberations, which is why
Chance Instrumentalism may seem attractive. But the view is incorrect: Chances can have
non-instrumental value too. Consider the following two examples:
4By saying that chances (and risks) can matter intrinsically, we do not mean that they are
or can be objectively or universally valuable. Rather, we mean that they can be intrinsically
valuable to some person in that they play the role of ultimate goods in his or her evaluative
reasoning. Nor do we mean that the chance’s value is in no way related to the value of what
it is a chance-of; but simply that the value of the chance is not exhausted by its instrumental
relationship to what it is a chance-of.
Example 1 (Taking Risks). Ann is an experienced mountain climber. She does not directly
seek death or severe injury, but nonetheless tackles climbs that puts her at risk of both. She
does this because part of the value of climbing, according to her, stems from the confrontation
of risk. Ann is not completely foolhardy and will not undertake climbs if the chances of death
or injury are too high. But for her the activity is of little worth if there is no associated chance
of death or injury, even though death and injury are outcomes that she would strongly prefer
to avoid. Indeed for her there is an optimal region of risk, where the chances of death or in-
jury are high enough to require courage of the climber, but not so high as to make the activity
foolish.
Example 2 (Equal Treatment). Bob’s father has been given a watch as a present, but since
he already has one, he decides it should go to one of his children. Bob doesn’t particularly
want or need the watch, but nonetheless is outraged when his father announces his intention
to give the watch to Bob’s sibling. Seeing Bob’s reaction, his father decides to toss a coin to
settle who gets the watch, which leaves Bob satisfied.
These two examples are very different, but share the common feature of a protagonist who
violates Chance Instrumentalism, since s/he finds the chance (or risk) of some outcome desir-
able even though s/he does not desire the outcome itself. Ann does not value the risk of death
and injury associated with climbing as means to these highly undesirable outcomes. Rather,
she values them as intrinsic features of an activity that she considers worthy. We do not have
to share Ann’s penchant for danger to recognise this type of value. It is often the case that the
difficulties associated with some activity or project (generically the risk of failure) are part
of what makes them worthy as activities or projects. This can be as true for extreme crochet-
ing as it is for mountaineering. And in these cases, there is an important difference between
achieving some outcome when the chances of failing were high and achieving it when suc-
cess was pretty much guaranteed; in violation of Chance Neutrality. Bob, on the other hand,
does not value the chance of a watch because of its instrumental relation to the outcome of
receiving the watch, since he does not even want the watch. Nor does he view the chances
neutrally: For him it is far worse not to get the watch when he never had a chance of getting
it than to not get it when he had a fair shot of doing so. So both Ann and Bob violate both
Chance Instrumentalism and Chance Neutrality.
There are two obvious responses to these examples available to the Chance Instrumental-
ist. Firstly, she can grant that these examples show that the value of the chance of some good
G is not always exhausted by its instrumental relation to G, but argue that the value of the
chance nonetheless derives from its instrumental relation to some good. Take our mountain
climber Ann. Ann does not seek death, but she does seek goods like the mental states of ex-
citement, exhilaration, or sense of pride, that come with confronting risk; and social goods
like the respect of other mountaineers and the admiration of those who are unable to con-
trol their fear of death. Similarly, although Bob does not want the watch, he does seek the
good of fair treatment and equal consideration by his parents, and being given a chance of
getting the watch symbolises for him his equal status amongst the children. More generally,
the Chance Instrumentalist will claim, for any chance proposition, there is some ‘ultimate’
good G∗ (which could, of course, be a bundle of goods like excitement, respect, health and so
on) such that the chance of G, given that G∗, is without value.
The instrumentalist is right in pointing to the existence of these other goods. But she has
the explanation the wrong way around. Ann does, let us suppose, get excitement and pride
from confronting risk, but this is not what is valuable to her about it. The excitement is a
by-product of the activity, not what makes it worthwhile in the first place. Even if she could
get as much excitement from a simulated climb as from the real thing, she would not judge
climbing ersatz mountains to be nearly as valuable as conquering real ones. The pride that she
feels from controlling fear depends even more directly on the value that she attaches to facing
(real) risks, and the same can be said about the respect that she receives from others. Ann val-
ues this respect just in case she believes it deserved. And those who respect her must, for the
respect to be valuable to her, agree with her in valuing the confrontation of risk independently
of the feelings it generates.
The second example requires a somewhat different response since Bob’s desire to be
treated fairly (as he sees it) is not a by-product of the value he attaches to the chance of get-
ting the watch. Rather it is intrinsic to him being treated fairly (as he sees it) that he should
have this chance. We could not, in other words, ensure that he gets the desired good of fair
treatment without giving him the chance of getting the watch; for Bob being given this chance
is part of being treated equally to his sibling. So in this case too, it is wrong to think of the
value of chances as deriving from an instrumental relation to some good.
A second response would be to follow John Broome’s (1991) re-individuation strategy as
a way of saving Chance Instrumentalism and Chance Neutrality from our criticism.5 Broome
points out that principles of rationality can often be saved from apparent counterexamples
by individuating the relevant outcomes more finely, in particular to make sure that different
outcomes get described differently. For instance, in Taking Risks, we can, formally speak-
ing, save Chance Instrumentalism by describing the results of Ann’s activities as conquering a
worthwhile or worthless mountain depending on whether the activity is risky or not; whereas
in Equal Treatment, we might make Bob’s attitude formally consistent with Chance Instru-
mentalism by describing two situations where he doesn’t receive the watch as ‘No watch and
fair treatment’/‘No watch and unfair treatment’. And similarly for other apparent violations
5We thank a referee for Philosophy of Science for pressing us on this issue.
of Chance Instrumentalism/Neutrality.
One problem with this way of saving Chance Instrumentalism is that there is a clear sense
in which the principle is only formally satisfied, but is not satisfied in a substantive sense.
The reason one mountain is a worthwhile challenge but another is not, according to Ann, is
that the former is risky but the latter is not; and the reason one situation where Bob gets no
watch is fair but another is not, on his view, is that in the former situation he had a chance of
receiving the watch but in the latter he had not. So the whole reason these re-individuations
allow us to formally save Chance Instrumentalism is that they build risks and chances into
the description of ultimate outcomes, which clearly goes against the intuition behind Chance
Neutrality and, by implication, against Chance Instrumentalism (since the latter entails the
former).
Moreover, the re-individuation strategy, if used indiscriminately, will trivialise decision
theory and other theories of rationality (as Broome 1999 himself points out) since it is always
possible to re-describe outcomes such that an apparent violation of a rationality principle is
made consistent with it. Our solution, however, can be seen as a principled application of
the re-individuation strategy. Building on the observation that agents sometimes legitimately
take risks and chances to be part of the outcomes they ultimately care about, we are suggest-
ing dropping Chance Neutrality and making objective probability distributions explicitly part
of the outcome space. Hence, we make room for attitudes that violate Chance Instrumental-
ism/Neutrality without running the risk of trivialising decision theory.6
6See Bradley and Stefa´nsson (2015) for a similar criticism of Broome’s re-individuation
strategy, but in a different context.
3 Three Rationality Theses About Chance
In this section we examine the relationship between three claims about rational attitudes to
chances that are the focus of this paper: Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle and Lin-
earity. First, we sketch a possible-worlds semantics for propositions about chance that is
maximally neutral with regard to the metaphysical status of chances and in particular to the
question of whether chance facts are reducible to non-chance facts. This enables us to give a
formal statement of the three claims and then to prove our main theorem: That in the presence
of the standard axioms of probability and desirability, Chance Neutrality and the Principal
Principle together entail Linearity. In Section 4 we argue that the Principal Principle is a re-
quirement of rationality, but in Section 5 that Linearity is not. Given our theorem, this entails
that Chance Neutrality is not a requirement of rationality.
3.1 Semantics
First, some notation. Let W be the set of base worlds, {w1,w2, ...,wn}, and ℘(W) = Ω the
set of all factual propositions {A,B,C, ...}, each proposition being a set of worlds in W. Then
let Π = {ch1, ch2, ...} be the set of all logically possible probability distributions over Ω, and
∆ = ℘(Π) = {Ch1,Ch2, ...} be the set of all chance propositions, i.e., propositions about the
chances of truth of propositions in Ω. Intuitively, the probability distributions serve as truth-
makers for claims about chances, i.e., as the basic chance facts. For instance, the proposition
that X has a chance greater than one-half is given by, or made true by, the set of chance func-
tions ch such that ch(X) > 0.5.
Next, we define a set of extended worlds,W = W × Π, the set of all pairs 〈w, ch〉, such
that w ∈ W and ch ∈ Π. Intuitively, an extended world gives a complete description of both
the base (non-modal) facts and the chance facts, so thatW serves, in this framework, as the
set of elementary possibilities. In the interests of metaphysical neutrality, we will remain ag-
nostic about what possible worlds and probability distributions are co-possible, though clearly
the framework is compatible with all kinds of restrictions. Strict reductionist theories require
each base world to be paired with a unique probability distribution; for instance, on the finite
frequency interpretation of chance, base facts about the proportions of outcomes that belong
to a certain class will determine the chances of these outcomes. Strict anti-reductionist views,
on the other hand, allow that any pair of base worlds and chance worlds are co-possible. All
kinds of intermediate positions are also conceivable of course.
The set of extended worldsW induces a corresponding set of extended propositions, Γ =
℘(W) = {A,B,C, ...}, the set of all sets of 〈w, ch〉 pairs. Extended propositions serve as the
possible contents of agents’ attitudes. In the interests of simplicity, for any A ∈ Ω and Ch ∈ ∆
we denote the element A ×Π of Γ by A and the element W × Ch of Γ by Ch, thus allowing us
to denote element A × Ch by A ∩ Ch, this being the set of extended worlds 〈w, ch〉 such that
w ∈ A and ch ∈ Ch.
In what follows, we use Ch(B) = α to denote the proposition that is true just in case
ch(B) = α; that is, the proposition that the chance of B is α (and the chance of ¬B is 1 − α).
And we use 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉 to denote the conjunction of the propositions Ch(A1) = α1,
Ch(A2) = α2, ..., Ch(An) = αn, where {Ai}ni=1 is an n-fold partition of Ω and the αi are
real numbers such that αi ∈ [0, 1] and∑ni=1 αi = 1. Each such proposition 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉
expresses the chances of realising each of the ‘prizes’ represented by the base propositions
Ai. The 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉 thus serve as the propositional equivalents, in this framework, of the
lotteries that appear in the orthodox theory of rational choice under objective uncertainty; in
particular, in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1953) expected utility theory. Let L be the
set of all such lottery propositions.
The final step is to characterise rational attitudes to these propositions. To do so we draw
on the version of decision theory developed by Richard Jeffrey (1983). It has two salient ad-
vantages in this context. First, because Jeffrey’s measures of rational degrees of belief and
desire are defined on the same space—the set of propositions—it is relatively simple to ex-
amine the relationship between rationality principles about practical and epistemic attitudes
to chances. Secondly, his basic theory depends on rather weak rationality assumptions rela-
tive to its main alternatives, i.e., compared to those based on Leonard Savage’s (1972) deci-
sion theory. (In particular, Jeffrey’s theory contains a much weaker separability axiom than
its alternatives.) This enables us to evaluate proposals for constraints on rational attitudes to
chances without taking too much for granted. It is worth noting that the differences between
Jeffrey’s (evidential) decision theory and the newer ‘causal’ decision theory do not matter
here, since we will not be discussing the choice-worthiness of actions. So any inadequacies of
Jeffrey’s theory in this regard are irrelevant to the present discussion.
In Jeffrey’s theory the degrees of belief of a rational agent are measured by a subjective
probability (or credence) function, P, on a Boolean algebra of propositions, satisfying the
standard probability axioms. Her degrees of desire are measured by a corresponding desir-
ability function, V, defined on the same algebra but with the logically contradictory proposi-
tion removed and satisfying:
Desirability: If A =
⋃





We will take these two measures, P and V, to be defined on the entire Boolean algebra of
propositions based on the set Γ.
3.2 The Chance Theorem
We are now in a position to state the three theses of interest to us. The first is a version of
David Lewis’ (1980) famous Principal Principle. The principle says that you should set your
degrees of belief in the truth of a proposition, conditional on its objective chance being some
numerical value, to that numerical value. This entails, for instance, that if you believe that a
coin has 0.5 chance of coming up heads, then you should believe to degree 0.5 that it will do
so. And, more generally, that your degree of belief in the coin coming up heads should equal
its expected chance of landing heads, relative to your degrees of belief in the various relevant
chance hypotheses. More formally:
Thesis 1 (Principal Principle). For any A ∈ Ω and 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉 ∈ L, if P(〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) ,
0, then:
P(Ai | 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) = αi
This statement of the Principal Principle differs from Lewis’s in a number of ways. Firstly,
our formulation is in some ways more simplistic than Lewis’. For instance, it ignores the fact
that the principle is not supposed to hold for propositions for which the agent in question has
inadmissible information, this being information whose relevance to the truth of the propo-
sition does not come entirely from its relevance to its chance of truth. It also ignores the fact
that chances evolve over time, which means that for a chance proposition to have a fixed truth
value, it must be time-indexed. In the next section we explain why our argument still holds
for less simplistic versions of the Principal Principle.
Secondly, while our version of the Principal Principle makes reference to an arbitrary par-
tition of propositions {Ai} with respect to which chances are specified, Lewis’s is restricted
to a two-element partition. Our principle obviously implies Lewis’s for, given a partition
{A,¬A}, it implies that:
P(A | Ch(A) = α) = α
And it seems evident that our version is no less plausible than Lewis’.7
The second thesis to be considered is the claim that chances are neutral in a practical or
desirabilistic sense; for example that the desirability of learning that you have a very rare
lethal condition is just the desirability of learning that you have the condition. Formally:
Thesis 2 (Chance Neutrality). For any A ∈ {Ai} and 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉 ∈ L:
V(〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉 ∩ Ai) = V(Ai)
The zero point in a Jeffrey-desirability measure is typically reserved for propositions, such
as the tautology >, whose truth is neither desirable nor undesirable (see e.g. Jeffrey 1983,
Section 5.6). In this case the standard definition of conditional desirability (Bradley 1999)
entails that V(〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉 | Ai) = V(〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉 ∩ Ai) − V(Ai). Then Chance Neutrality
7In fact, Thesis 1 can be derive from Lewis’ principle if we make the natural assumption
that when one has already conditioned a subjective probability function on a proposition that
says that the chance of Ai is αi, then conditioning the function on another proposition that
says that the chance of A j is α j, where Ai ∩A j = Ø, won’t make a difference to the function’s
assignment of probability to Ai (provided that the two chance propositions are consistent). In
other words, given this assumption, P(Ai | Ch(Ai) = αi ∩ Ch(A j) = α j) = P(Ai | Ch(Ai) = αi);
which, given Lewis’ Principal Principle, is equal to αi.
implies that:
V(〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉 | Ai) = 0
In other words, given the truth of Ai, the desirability of a chance distribution over a partition
of which Ai is a member is zero. This implication of Chance Neutrality is perhaps even closer
to the intuitive idea of the neutrality of chances than Thesis 2 is, and could serve as an alter-
native formalisation of it in contexts in which the zero-normalisation can be assumed.
The final thesis of interest, Linearity, states that the value of a lottery proposition is a
chance-weighted average of the values of its outcomes (or ‘prizes’):
Thesis 3 (Linearity). For any A ∈ Ω and αi ∈ [0, 1] such that∑i αi = 1:




Linearity can be thought of as a transcription of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected
utility theory into this propositional framework. It says that, for instance, the desirability of
getting 10 if a coin comes up heads but 0 if it comes up tails, is equal to the desirability of 10
times the probability of heads plus the desirability of 0 times the probability of tails.
The three theses we have been discussing are independent of each other and none are
entailed by Jeffrey’s basic framework. But as we now prove, within Jeffrey’s framework,
Chance Neutrality together with the Principal Principle implies Linearity.
Theorem 1. Assume Chance Neutrality. Then the Principal Principle entails Linearity.
Proof. Since
⋃{Ai ∩ 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉} is a partition of 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉, we have:
V(〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) =
∑
i
V(Ai ∩ 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) · P(Ai | 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) (1)
By Chance Neutrality, (1) becomes:
V(〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) =
∑
i
V(Ai) · P(Ai | 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) (2)
Now assume the Principal Principle. Then (2) becomes:
V(〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) =
∑
i
V(Ai) · αi (3)
In other words, Chance Neutrality and the Principal Principle entail Linearity. 
3.3 Objections and Refinements
There are two types of objections we need to consider. First, as noted before, the version
of the Principal Principle stated above is arguably too simplistic. As Lewis (1994) himself
recognised, this version of the principle leads to contradiction if we allow for the possibil-
ity that a chance function ch assigns positive chance to an ‘undermining future’; that is, to a
sequence of events such that if they all take place, then the chances are different from what
ch says they are. Let F be a proposition that undermines ch in the aforementioned sense, and
suppose that ch(F) > 0. Now let Ch be the proposition that the chances are what ch says they
are. By Lewis’ original Principal Principle, P(F | Ch) > 0. But since F undermines ch, we
have F ⊃ ¬Ch, so Ch ⊃ ¬F, which means that P(F | Ch) = 0, in contradiction to what the
Principal Principle entails since F has a positive chance according to ch.
Various popular theories of chance, according to which chances supervene on what actu-
ally occurs, entail that undermining futures can have a positive chance. In particular, Lewis’
own Best System theory of chance entails this possibility. Hence, Lewis admitted that there
was a need to amend his own principle. The most natural way to do so is as follows:
Thesis 4 (New Principle). For any A ∈ Ω and 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉 ∈ L, if P(〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) , 0,
then:
P(Ai | 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) = ch(Ai | Ch)
For then if F undermines ch, the New Principle entails that P(F | 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) = ch(F |
Ch) = 0, which means that we don’t reach the contradiction we reached above.8
Replacing the Principal Principle with the New Principle makes no difference to our argu-
ment however as we can prove much same theorem as above. For notice that the New Prin-
ciple entails that P(Ai | 〈Ch(Ai) = αi〉) = ch(Ai | Ch) = αi,9 which means that a simple
variant of the proof of Theorem 1 shows that Chance Neutrality and the New Principle entail
Linearity.
Another reason why our original statement of the Principal Principle is too simplistic, is
that it ignores the fact that if one knows whether or not A is true, then that knowledge should
‘trump’ one’s knowledge of A’s chance. To take a typical but unrealistic example: Suppose
a perfectly reliable oracle informs you that a coin that is about to be tossed has 0.5 chance of
coming up heads and actually will come up heads. To what degree should you then believe
that the coin comes up heads? If you really think that the oracle is perfectly reliable, it seems
you should ignore what you know about the chances, and fully believe that the coin will come
up heads.
8The New Principle was independently suggested by Lewis (1994) and Ned Hall (1994) as
a correction of the Principal Principle.
9Recall that Ch is true just in case the chances are what ch says they are. Hence, for any
F that undermines ch, by conditioning ch on Ch we exclude F from the domain of ch; and, in
particular, make sure that ch is correct about Ai.
Information of the above kind is what Lewis called ‘inadmissible’. Although he did not
give a precise definition of inadmissibility, he suggested that evidence is inadmissible when-
ever it affects your beliefs about the outcomes of events or the truth of propositions without
affecting your beliefs about the chances of these outcomes or propositions (Lewis, 1980,
265). And as Lewis rightly pointed out, the Principal Principle only holds when an agent
does not have evidence that is inadmissible with respect to the proposition that is being evalu-
ated.10
Now it follows from the above observation that what is entailed by the Principal Princi-
ple and Chance Neutrality is Linearity limited to propositions for which the agent in question
does not have inadmissible information. But on reflection, it should be evident that even the
proponent of Linearity should in general take the principle to be limited to such propositions.
Recall that Linearity states that the value of a lottery is a chance-weighted average of the val-
ues of its outcomes. Suppose lottery L has only two possible outcomes, O1 and O2. Now the
oracle tells you that the two outcomes have the same chance and that the lottery will actually
result in O2. By Chance Neutrality, the chance of O2 (and O1) then becomes irrelevant from a
practical point of view. Moreover, since you know that the lottery won’t result in O1, it seems
your evaluation of the lottery should no longer be affected by the instrumental value it previ-
ously had in virtue of possibly realising O1. So the value of the lottery is certainly no longer
a chance-weighted average of the values of O1 and O2. Thus we have an intuitive explanation
of why Linearity should be limited to a situation where the agent has no inadmissible infor-
mation about the propositions in question.
Finally, the above statement of the Principal Principle ignores the fact that chances seem
10It should be noted, however, that Hall (1994), amongst others, argues that unlike the
Principal Principle, the New Principle does not need an admissibility clause.
to evolve over time. For instance, remembering in the last minute to put an extra sweater
on before leaving the house reduces the chance that one catches a cold. Moreover, once a
chancy event has taken place (or not), its chance becomes 1 (or 0) according to most theories
of chance. (For a notable exception, see Hoefer 2007.) If chances change over time, chance
propositions must, strictly speaking, be time-indexed if they are to have a fixed truth-value.
But then all the rationality principles that we have been discussing should be reformulated
in the same way, by time-indexing the chance propositions that occur in their statements.
Hence, our proof of the above theorem still goes through after we have made the appropriate
changes. But to keep the notation as simple as possible, we will continue without the time-
indexing.11
The second type of objection we need to deal with has to do with our formalisation of the
intuitive idea of chance neutrality. One might argue that even if chances only have instrumen-
tal value, Chance Neutrality as formulated above should be rejected, since the desirability of
a chance of A is not exhausted by the value it has in virtue of being instrumental in making
it true that A. Learning that the chance of A is high might affect our beliefs about the chance
of some other proposition B and so have evidential value. For example, even if I know that I
have some disease, learning what were my chances of contracting it might be important if it
tells me something about my susceptibility to disease more generally or about the availability
of treatments for it. (For example, the less common the disease, the more likely it perhaps is
that there is something seriously wrong with my immune system, and the less likely it is that
11The idea that chances evolve over time might give rise to worries about the diachronic
consistency of an agent who violates Chance Neutrality (we thanka referee for Philosophy of
Science for raising this issue). But as we point out later, giving up Chance Neutrality does not
imply giving up the Independence condition that ensures dynamic consistency.
an advanced treatment has been developed for the disease.)
To avoid this objection, the Chance Neutrality thesis could be stated in terms of possible
(base) worlds rather than propositions, so that it says that once we know which base world is
actual, chances should not matter. More formally, let Wi = {w} × ∆ be the proposition that
world wi is the case. We will call Wi a world proposition and any proposition 〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉
expressing the chances of the world propositions Wi a lottery proposition. The new thesis can
then be stated as:
Thesis 5 (Chance Neutrality*). For any lottery proposition 〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉 and world proposi-
tion W j:
V(〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉 ∩W j) = V(W j)
Chance Neutrality* doesn’t imply Linearity as originally formulated, but together with the
Principal Principle it does imply a version that is similarly restricted to worlds. Formally:
Thesis 6 (Linearity*). For any lottery proposition 〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉 with αi ∈ [0, 1] such that∑n
i=1 αi = 1:




Linearity* is even closer than Linearity to being a statement of von Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s expected utility theory within the Jeffrey framework, since the former lacks the partition-
independent feature of the latter. To bring out the parallel, note that the subset L of Γ con-
sisting of the lottery propositions 〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉 forms a mixture space that is closed under
linear combinations, with the linear combination of lottery propositions 〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉 and
〈Ch(Wi) = βi〉, with respect to a real number λ ∈ [0, 1], being defined by:
λ(〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉) + (1 − λ)(〈Ch(Wi) = βi〉) := 〈Ch(Wi) = λαi + (1 − λ)βi〉
Moreover, note that 〈Ch(Wi) = λαi+(1−λ)βi〉 is itself a lottery proposition, ensuring closure.
Linearity* then implies that preferences on the lottery propositions satisfy the von Neumann
and Morgenstern Independence axiom, which can be rendered here as the requirement that for
all L,L′,M ∈ L and λ ∈ [0, 1]:
Independence Axiom. λL + (1 − λ)M % λL′ + (1 − λ)M⇔ L % L′
Chance Neutrality* and Independence are conceptually distinct ideas. In particular, an agent
can perfectly well view the desirability of the chances of two different goods as independent
of each other, but value the chances of both goods intrinsically. But, as we prove below, in the
presence of the Principal Principle, Chance Neutrality* implies Linearity* and hence Inde-
pendence. The other direction does not hold however: Linearity* is not sufficient to derive the
Principal Principle or Chance Neutrality*, even in the presence of the other condition. Hence
Independence does not imply Chance Neutrality* even given the Principal Principle.
Nor, it should be noted, does Independence alone imply Linearity or Linearity*. This is
important because we will argue against the latter conditions, and hence for the rejection of
Chance Neutrality. But these arguments are not in themselves arguments for rejecting Inde-
pendence. The Independence axiom is quite controversial as a principle of rational prefer-
ence, with proponents arguing that it is a condition of dynamic consistency and opponents
pointing to putatively permissable violations of it in the Allais paradox and elsewhere. But it
is Chance Neutrality that is our target, not Independence.
Theorem 2. Given the Principal Principle, Chance Neutrality* implies Linearity*.
Proof. By the Desirability axiom:
V(〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉) =
∑
i
V(〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉 ∩Wi) · P(Wi | 〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉) (4)
But the Principal Principle entails that P(Wi | 〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉) = αi and Chance Neutrality*
that V(〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉 ∩Wi) = V(Wi). So adding these two principles to (5) gives us:
V(〈Ch(Wi) = αi〉) =
∑
i
αi · V(Wi) (5)
In other words, the Principal Principal and Chance Neutrality* entail Linearity*. 
4 The Principal Principle and Practical Rationality
David Lewis (1980) thought the Principal Principle (PP) “captures all we know about chance”
(266). Although not everyone agrees with him that the principle captures everything we know
about chance, most concur that it captures the essence of how our degrees of belief, or cre-
dence, should relate to our knowledge of (or beliefs about) chances. In other words, most
people agree that some version of the principle is a requirement of theoretical rationality.12
It is sufficient for our argument that the Principal Principle is a norm of theoretical ratio-
nality. For if people ought to align their credences with their beliefs about chance, but are not
rationally required to satisfy Linearity, as we will argue, then they cannot be required (by ra-
tionality) to satisfy Chance Neutrality. Nevertheless, in this section we will seek to answer
the question: Is the PP a requirement of practical rationality? Answering this question is in-
dependently interesting, we think, but particularly so in the present context, since if Linearity
and Chance Neutrality are rationality requirements, then they must be requirements of practi-
12In addition to seeming intuitively very plausible as a principle of theoretical rationality,
the epistemic importance of the Principal Principle has been justified on the grounds that it
maximises epistemic utility (or accuracy). See in particular (Pettigrew 2012, 2013).
cal rationality, since they are principles about rational desire rather than belief.13
The best way to evaluate the Principal Principle as a norm of practical rationality, is to en-
vision a situation where we are choosing between ‘lotteries’ with known (and fixed) chances
(i.e., objective probabilities) for prizes. For this is exactly the type of situation where, first,
knowledge of chances are practically important, and, second, the Principal Principle has
something to say. (In contrast, the Principal Principle is silent in situations where one does
not know the chances, and it has no practical relevance in situations where the chances are
not relevant for decision-making.) But it should be emphasised that ‘lotteries’ is a technical
term, that can stand for any prospect that gives rise to a known chance distribution over possi-
ble outcomes. ‘Chances’ can also be interpreted in different ways, the only requirement being
that they play the role chances do in the Principal Principle.
Would it be practically irrational to violate the Principal Principle in a situation like the
one just described? It might be tempting to argue that since one is guaranteed to lose money
in the long run if one violates the PP when choosing between lotteries with known chances,
adherence to the principle is a requirement of practical rationality. The problem with this ar-
gument is that the ‘long run’ is very long indeed. Someone who violates the principle, in a
situation like the one we are imagining, is only guaranteed to win less than a person who sat-
isfies the principle if the number of lotteries they partake in is infinite. It is true, of course,
that as the number of lotteries increases, it becomes more and more likely that the person who
satisfies the principle wins more than the person who does not. But the important question is:
13It might be worth emphasising that the aim here is not to give a complete argument for
the Principal Principle as a requirement of rationality. We will take it for granted that the
principle (in some form) is a requirement of theoretical rationality, and try to show that it is
no less plausible as a requirement of practical rationality.
Why should practical rationality require that someone who only partakes in a single game of
chance satisfies the Principal Principle?
A stronger reason to take the Principal Principle to be a requirement of practical rational-
ity, is the fact that given one additional assumption, a person satisfies the Principal Principle
just in case she satisfies an objective version of the well-known Stochastic Dominance prin-
ciple (SD) in the situation we are imagining. The objective Stochastic Dominance principle
says that if for any outcome some lottery L1 has at least as high chance as lottery L2 of re-
sulting in that or a better outcome, then one should not prefer L2 to L1. Expected utility max-
imisers satisfy a subjective version of this principle, where ‘chance’ has been replaced with
‘credence’, and so do those who maximise risk-weighted expected utility, as formulated by
Lara Buchak (2013), and those who maximise Jeffrey’s (1983) desirability.
In a situation like the one we are imagining, where the decision-maker knows the chances,
it would certainly seem to be practically irrational to violate objective Stochastic Dominance.
Suppose lotteries L1 and L2 either result in a prize of $100 or nothing, and that Alice really
wants the money, which is the only good she considers relevant when choosing between these
lotteries. Moreover, she knows that lottery L1 has an objective 0.3 chance of yielding the
prize, but lottery L2 gives a 0.2 chance of winning the prize. (We are assuming that playing
the lotteries is cost-free.) Then surely it would be practically irrational of Alice to choose lot-
tery L2 over L1.
Someone might object that Ann the mountain climber violates objective Stochastic Dom-
inance, despite being (we claimed) rational: She prefers a mountain climb with some chance
of not succeeding over one where she is guaranteed to succeed. But this objection fails to
take into account the fact that Ann considers the chance distribution to be part of the ultimate
goods she cares about. When we take this into account, we should see that Ann is guaranteed
to satisfy objective Stochastic Dominance, if we assume that she satisfies the Principal Prin-
ciple and is practically rational in all other respects, meaning that she always prefers what she
believes to be the best means to her ends. More precisely, the assumption is that, in addition
to satisfying the PP, her preferences can be represented as maximising the value function of
some normative theory of rational choice (e.g. expected utility theory, risk-weighted expected
utility theory, Jeffrey’s evidential decision theory, causal decision theory, etc.).
It is easy to see that given the above assumption, if a decision-maker satisfies the Principal
Principle, then she satisfies objective Stochastic Dominance when choosing between lotteries
with known and fixed chances. Since she is a maximiser her degrees of belief satisfy subjec-
tive SD. And if she satisfies the PP, then her beliefs about how likely each lottery is to yield
each prize will match the chances associated with that lottery. Hence, she satisfies objective
SD. So a maximiser who satisfies the PP satisfies objective SD when she knows the chances.
A simple example will suffice to show that a person who violates the Principal Princi-
ple, but is some sort of maximiser, violates objective Stochastic Dominance when choosing
between lotteries with known chances. For if there is one pair of such lotteries where she vi-
olates objective SD, then she of course does not satisfy objective SD as a general principle
in this type of situation. Suppose now that although Alice knows that the chance lottery L1
has of yielding the prize is 0.3, but lottery L2 gives a 0.2 chance of winning the prize, her cre-
dence in winning the prize from these two lotteries is reversed: She believes to degree 0.2 that
lottery L1 will result in the prize but to degree 0.3 that lottery L2 will. In other words, Alice
violates the Principal Principle. Then assuming that she prefers winning the prize to not, she
will prefer lottery L2 to L1, since the former subjectively stochastically dominates the latter.14
14Recall that we are assuming that the only good Alice cares about, in this situation, is
money. However, we should emphasise again that this assumption is not essential for our ar-
But that means that she prefers the option that is objectively stochastically dominated. This
will generally be true: If a person violates the Principal Principle, then given a large enough
set of lotteries with known chances, we can always offer her a pair of lotteries with respect to
which she violates objective Stochastic Dominance.
To sum up: It seems that in the situation we are envisioning—namely, one where a per-
son is choosing between lotteries with known chances for prizes—it would be practically
irrational to violate the objective version of the Stochastic Dominance principle. But that is
exactly the type of situation that is relevant for evaluating whether the Principal Principle is a
requirement of practical rationality. Hence, since an otherwise practically rational person sat-
isfies objective SD in this situation just in case she satisfies the PP, we conclude that the latter
is a requirement of practical rationality.
5 Linearity is Not a Requirement of Rationality
In Section 2 we proved that, given the Principal Principle, Chance Neutrality implies Lin-
earity and Chance Neutrality* implies Linearity*. Moreover, we have argued that the Prin-
cipal Principle is a requirement of practical rational. Hence, to show that Chance Neutrality
(Chance Neutrality*) is not rationally required, it is sufficient to show that Linearity (Linear-
ity*) is not a requirement of rationality. That is the aim of this section.15 The difference be-
tween Linearity and Linearity* will not make any difference to the arguments in this section,
gument. In particular, we need not assume Chance Neutrality for the argument to go through.
All that is required, is the assumption that the person satisfies subjective Stochastic Domi-
nance, which she will do if she is a maximiser.
15But we should emphasise that we reject Linearity only with respect to chance, not cre-
dence.
so we will simply refer to the former.
Linearity is a very powerful condition. It makes it possible to identify the value of a lot-
tery with the sum of the probability weighted values of its prizes. Hence, it makes it easy
to calculate the value of lotteries of the type we discussed in the last section, once the value
of each prize has been determined. More generally, Linearity ensures that for any prospect
that results in a (objective) probability distribution over possible outcomes, the value of the
prospect is fully determined by this probability distribution and the values we assign to the
outcomes.
Just how strong a constraint it places on an agent’s attitudes is exemplified by the fact that
it implies risk neutrality with respect to desirability value. To take an example, Linearity en-
tails that a person cannot but be indifferent between a good that has desirability value 1 and a
50/50 gamble that either results in a good with desirability value 0 or one with a desirability
value of 2. However, if a person prefers $30 for sure to a lottery that has 0.5 chance of result-
ing in the person winning $100 but an equal chance of her receiving nothing, then Linearity
entails that this person evaluates the difference between winning $30 and winning $0 to be
greater than the difference between winning $100 and winning $30. In other words, a person
with the preference in question can only satisfy Linearity if she thinks that the desirability of
each extra dollar when she has already won $30 is (on average) less than the desirability of
each dollar before she wins $30.
This feature of the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory has been a common object of
criticism, with critics complaining that the theory cannot fully account for other rational at-
titudes to risk (see, for instance, Hansson 1988 and Buchak 2013). The critics ask: What if
a person insists that she values each extra dollar equally, no matter how much she has won
before, but nevertheless prefers the prospect of $30 for sure to the 50/50 gamble on winning
$100 or nothing? Their preference for the sure prospect over the gamble has nothing to do
with how she evaluates marginal increases in monetary outcomes, the person may insist, but
is simply due to her aversion to accepting the risk of something bad in exchange for a chance
of something good.
The main weakness of this objection is that it assumes that people have a direct access to
how desirable an outcome is, not just by itself, but also in comparison to all other outcomes;
and can figure this out without consulting her preferences for lotteries, or uncertain prospects,
involving these outcomes. And that may seem questionable. Can we really say for sure, and
in exact terms, how desirable it is to win the 61st dollar, compared to how desirable it is to
win the 30th dollar, without considering what lotteries we would accept?16
It might seem that in moral evaluations we do have direct access to the types of values
that are required to make an argument of the above kind. Various moral theories, for instance,
entail that if both Ann and Bob are dying of cancer, and if their situation is exactly the same
in all morally relevant respects, then the moral value of treating both of them is exactly twice
the value of treating only one of them. But then Linearity entails that we should be indiffer-
ent between being able to treat Ann (or Bob) for sure, and a lottery that has a 50/50 chance
of resulting in either a treatment for both or for neither. But many people will reject that en-
tailment. Some will say that we should prefer treating one for sure, since the risk of treating
neither is not worth the chance of treating both, while others will say that reasons of fairness
require us to prefer the lottery since it gives both Ann and Bob some chance of being treated.
Nevertheless, on the face of it, it seems that these people need not deny that treating both Ann
and Bob is twice as valuable as treating one of them.
This argument too rests on the assumption that direct ascertainment of moral value, inde-
16For an interesting debate of this issue, see (Watkins 1977) and (Harsanyi, 1977).
pendently of considerations of risk, is possible. And so it is not likely to persuade adherents
of the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory. Fortunately, we do not have to be persuaded
by either of the above arguments to see the benefits of giving up Linearity as a rationality re-
quirement. For a theorem proved by Matthew Rabin (2000), which makes no assumptions
about people’s abilities to evaluate outcomes without consulting their preferences for lotteries
involving these outcomes, seriously weakens the plausibility of the claim that Linearity is a
requirement of rationality. The theorem itself is rather convoluted, so we won’t state it for-
mally, but in the next two paragraphs we provide two examples of what the theorem entails,
which should suffice to show how damaging it is for the claim that Linearity is rationally re-
quired. (In the paragraph after that, we give an illustration of Rabin’s proof.) The lesson from
the theorem is that if all departures from risk neutrality must be explained in terms of the
agent’s utility function over actual outcomes—as we must do if we assume Linearity—and
if a person is generally risk averse (more precisely, her utility function is concave at all points
in a specified range), then a modest risk aversion with respect to small stakes entails absurdly
high levels of risk aversion for larger stakes.17
17One might perhaps question the rationality of modest risk aversion, for instance by point-
ing out that in the long run, such an attitude is likely to make the agent worse off than if she
were risk neutral, since she will, for instance, forgo gambles with a positive monetary expec-
tation. (We thank a referee for Philosophy of Science for pressing us on this issue.) Our claim
is not that moderate risk aversion is always rational, nor that such an attitude is rationally
required. However, it is a widely observed fact that people very often do display a modest risk
aversion when it comes to gambles with low stakes, and most people have the intuition that
there is nothing irrational about that. Hence, we think that decision theory should have room
for such attitudes without thereby entailing that the agents in question must be absurdly risk
Here is an example of what Rabin’s theorem entails: If from any total wealth level,18 a
person turns down a 50/50 bet that results in her either losing $100 or gaining $110, then
she must turn down 50/50 bets that result in her either losing $1,000 or gaining any sum of
money—including an infinite sum! But that seems implausible. One could reasonably doubt
that the antecedent of this conditional is very often satisfied (Armendt 2014), since most peo-
ple would, when they are sufficiently rich, perhaps accept the bet in the antecedent. However,
we can easily imagine a person who does reject the former bet for all total wealth levels, and
it seems that this person would not be rationally required to turn down 50/50 bets of losing
$1,000 or gaining an infinite sum of money.
There are other less extreme implications of Rabin’s theorem whose antecedents are much
more likely to be satisfied. Here is one such example: A person who turns down, when her
total wealth is less than $300,000, a 50/50 gamble that results in her either losing $100 or
winning $125, must, when her wealth is $290,000, turn down a 50/50 gamble that results in
averse with respect to larger stakes. For it is our belief that decision theory should in general
be consistent with considered preferences of otherwise rational people.
18One might worry that we are here introducing the wealth of a person as an important
ingredient in explaining her choices, without explicitly representing wealth levels in the for-
mal framework we developed in Section 3. (We thank a referee for Philosophy of Science
for reminding us of the need to address this worry.) The worry is unnecessary. A Jeffrey-
desirability function is always taken to be implicitly conditioned on whatever the agent takes
to be her status-quo. So in particular, the function always takes into account the wealth of
the person whose desires the function represents. Hence, given that our framework is an ex-
tension of Jeffrey’s, there is no need to explicitly account for an agent’s wealth level in our
framework.
her either losing $600 or winning $36,000,000,000. But that is absurd. Very many people
would turn down the first bet at the wealth level in question, but hardly anybody would turn
down the second bet, and there is nothing irrational about this pair of choices. But if that is
so, then there are attitudes to lotteries that are inconsistent with Linearity but are nevertheless
not irrational. Hence, Linearity cannot be rationally required.
Although we will not give a general proof of Rabin’s theorem, the following illustration
(based on Rabin 2000, 1282) of how the proof works might be instructive, since it shows how
little has to be assumed to prove the theorem. Let’s focus on a person who at all wealth lev-
els turns down a 50/50 gamble that results in her either winning $11 or losing $10. Since she
turns down the bet for her actual wealth level, she must, given Linearity, value the 11th dol-
lar above her current wealth at most 10/11 as much as she values the 10th to last dollar of
her current wealth. (Recall that Linearity entails that people are risk-neutral with respect to
desirability, and that risk averse behaviour with respect to money must be due to the decreas-
ing marginal worth of money.) Similarly, since she would turn down the bet if she were $21
richer, she must value the 32nd dollar above her current wealth at most 10/11 as much as the
11th dollar above her current wealth, and hence at most (10/11)2 as much as the 10th to last
dollar of her current wealth. By the same reasoning, since she would turn down the bet if she
were $189 richer, she values the 200th dollar from her current wealth level at most (10/11)10
as much as she values the 10th to last dollar of her current wealth. Iterating this procedure
allows us to figure out the rate at which the value of extra dollars decrease, according to this
person, which allows us to determine what bets she will accept. And it turns out that since
she is unwilling to accept the bet in question at any wealth level, she should, by Linearity,
be unwilling to accept a 50/50 bet that results in her either losing $145 or gaining an infinite
amount of money!19
The theorem’s strongest assumption is that the agent’s value function is concave every-
where in the specified wealth range. That assumption may not very often be satisfied in prac-
tice, since the value of, say, an extra dollar might increase at certain points; for instance,
when an agent is close to having enough money to buy a new house or make other invest-
ments that would in some way change her life. However, the point is that again, we can imag-
ine a person that satisfies the conditions of the theorem. And we think that it would be unfor-
tunate if our theory of practical rationality required that person to satisfy the conditionals that
Rabin’s theorem entails.
Once we give up Chance Neutrality we can avoid Rabin’s result. For instance, although
Jeffrey’s theory entails risk neutrality with respect to desirability (since it satisfies Linearity
for credence), his theory, after it has been extended to chance propositions (and if we abandon
Chance Neutrality), makes it possible to explain people’s preferences for gambles in terms of
their (conative) attitudes to chances. In other words, unlike what von Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s theory—and, more generally, Linearity—requires, and contrary to the assumption of
Rabin’s theorem, we need not, once we have extended Jeffrey’s theory to chance propositions,
explain all risk attitudes with respect to, say, money, in terms of people’s attitudes to mone-
tary outcomes. Therefore, people whose utility function for money is generally concave, and
who satisfy the antecedents of Rabin’s conditionals, need not satisfy their consequents.
19A proof of the last claim can be found here: http://merlin.fae.ua.es/iturbe/RabinEcon00.pdf.
6 Concluding Remarks on Risk Aversion
There is a substantial decision-theoretic literature challenging the orthodox theory of decision-
making under objective uncertainty deriving from the seminal work of von Neumann and
Morgenstern, and in particular challenging the Independence axiom that is its cornerstone.
Much of it takes Maurice Allais’ (1953) infamous paradox, and the now-abundant evidence
drawn from experimental studies of choices amongst lotteries, to show that people can exhibit
apparently-rational patterns of preference that cannot be represented as maximising expected
utility. And in its wake a number of models of decision-making under uncertainty have been
proposed, of which cumulative prospect theory and rank-dependent utility theory (or antici-
pated utility) are perhaps the most established (see, for instance, Quiggin 1982, Tversky and
Wakker 1995, Wakker 2010), all of which allow for violations of Linearity.
A full evaluation of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, but in view of the fact
that our argument shares some common features with it, a few remarks are in order. First, a
central motivation of this literature is a perceived inadequacy of the treatment of risk aver-
sion in the orthodox theory (something we alluded to before). Linearity, while perfectly con-
sistent with risk aversion with respect to undesirable outcomes, requires risk neutrality with
respect to the utilities of these outcomes. But experimental evidence suggests that people of-
ten give more weight to the difference between the certainty of avoiding loss and a very low
probability of loss than they do to equal differences in the probabilities of losses when these
probabilities are quite high. In rank-dependent utility theory these ‘non-linear’ attitudes to the
chances are modelled by a transformation of the probabilities into non-probabilistic decision
weights on the utilities of the outcomes. Our treatment suggests instead that these attitudes
should be incorporated into the agent’s desirability function by taking chances to be features
of the world that the agent cares about. These two approaches may predict much the same
behaviour, which makes a transformation of the probabilities into non-probabilistic decision
weights unnecessary. Nevertheless, the two approaches are distinct in their understanding of
the attitudes that underpin the behaviour in question. Whereas rank-dependent utility theory
and theories based on it (such as Buchak’s (2013)) suggests that risk attitudes are a type of
attitude that is distinct from the desires that utility (or desirability) functions represent, our
approach assumes that risk attitudes are just a particular type of desire.
Secondly, it has not been generally recognised in this literature that if the aforementioned
arguments against Linearity are accepted, then it is not just the typical preferences displayed
in the Allais paradox that may be rational, but also the pattern of preferences often observed
in the Ellsberg paradox. The typical Ellsberg preferences have widely been taken to challenge
the normative adequacy of Bayesianism. But as Bradley (2015) has shown, these preferences
are perfectly compatible with the standard preference axioms of Bayesian decision theory,
provided that agents who have these preferences take the chances in Ellsberg’s lotteries to
be ultimate goods with decreasing marginal utility. Indeed, the Ellsberg preferences may be
regarded as further evidence against Chance Neutrality, since rejecting the principle would
allow for a rationalisation of preferences that many consider to be intuitively rational.
We can put the point in another way. The Ellsberg preferences are commonly thought to
result from ambiguity aversion; i.e., from a preference for lotteries with known rather than
unknown probabilities. Many of those who reject Linearity nonetheless think that such aver-
sion is irrational, perhaps because they implicitly accept Chance Neutrality.20 But since the
rejection of Linearity means that Chance Neutrality is not a requirement of rationality, the
20To take just one example, see Buchak (2013), who rejects Linearity because of what it
entails about rational risk attitdues, but nonetheless develops a theory of rational choice that is
inconsistent with the Ellsberg preferences.
door is open to accommodating ambiguity aversion within Bayesian decision theory by al-
lowing rational agents to have non-neutral attitudes to chances.
Finally, the main aim of this paper has been critical and focused on developing an argu-
ment against the deeply entrenched assumption of Chance Neutrality. But, as the above re-
marks suggest, we think of the rejection of Chance Neutrality as the first step in a positive
programme of developing a decision theory that explicitly represents both objective and sub-
jective uncertainty and which allows for a wide range of rational desirability attitudes to the
former. Such a programme holds out the promise of a unified and principled treatment of risk
attitudes and a resolution of associated decision-theoretic paradoxes, as well as opens a door
to domain-specific studies of the relationship between agents’ attitudes to quantities of rel-
evant goods and their attitudes to chances of them (for there seems to be no good reason to
think that the relationships between quantities and chances of money should be the same as
between, say, health outcomes and their chances). But evidently we have only taken the first
steps in that direction in this paper.
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